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UNSEATING PRIVILEGE: RAWLS, EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY, AND WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION
JENNIFER BIRD-POLLANt
ABSTRACT
This Article is the second in a series that examines the estate tax
from a particular philosophical position in order to demonstrate the
relevance and importance of the wealth transfer taxes to that position. In
this Article, I explore Rawlsian equality of opportunity, a philosophical
position that is at the heart of much American thought. Equality of
opportunity requires not only ensuring that sufficient opportunities are
available to the least well-off members of society but also that
opportunities are not available to other members merely because of their
wealth or other arbitrary advantages. Therefore, an income tax alone,
even one with high rates on the wealthy, would be insufficient to achieve
these goals. While revenue raised via the income tax should be used to
provide additional opportunities to low-income members of society,
wealth transfer taxes provide the additional safeguard of preventing the
heirs of wealthy individuals from inheriting wealth that would provide
them with additional, unwarranted and unjust, opportunities. Given the
importance of the wealth transfer taxes, this Article also examines the
question of what form of tax is most consistent with Rawls' position,
ultimately determining that an inheritance or accessions tax best fits the
role.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The modem estate tax in the United States dates from 1916,' but the
recent history of the tax makes clear that it is in decline.2 While
1. See generally Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub & Barry W. Johnson, The
Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Counting, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 118,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soilninetyestate.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). The estate tax
(a tax on transfers made at the death of the donor) was first enacted in the United States
in 1916. The first estate tax was enacted with no accompanying gift tax, meaning that the
tax could easily be avoided by having the donor transfer the majority of her assets tax-
free during her lifetime rather than wait until death to pass on her wealth. Congress
realized the absence of a gift tax was eviscerating the estate tax. As a result, the first gift
tax (a tax on transfers made during the donor's lifetime) was enacted in 1924 but repealed
in 1926. The modem gift tax was enacted in 1932, and the United States has had both gift
and estate taxes for all years since then, with the exception of the one-year repeal of the
estate tax in 2010.
2. Before the passing of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001 (EGTRRA), the Code provided a lifetime credit against tax of $675,000. Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 2010 (2006) [hereinafter Code] (all citations to
sections are citations to the Code). Any transfers made, whether inter vivos or after death,
that exceeded the credit amount were taxed at 55%. § 2001. EGTRRA slowly increased
the lifetime credit amount and simultaneously lowered the rate, culminating in a one-year
repeal of the estate tax in 2010. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE
BRIEF: FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES (Dec. 2009), [hereinafter ECONOMIC AND
BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF], available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
ftpdocs/108xx/doc10841/12-18-estate-gifttax-brief.pdf. The peculiarities of EGTRRA
resulted in a complete sunset of the law on December 31, 2010. Id. Congress and
President Obama signed a two-year extension of the EGTRRA provisions, including a
reinstitution of the estate tax with a $5 million lifetime credit (indexed for inflation) and a
35% rate on amounts transferred above the credit amount. Id. That extension expired on
December 31, 2012, at which point the estate and gift tax credit and rate were scheduled
to revert to 2001 levels. Id. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that extending
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historically the tax collected as much as ten percent of total tax revenues,
that percentage has decreased dramatically in recent years, and now the
wealth transfer taxes (including the estate tax, the gift tax, and the
generation-skipping transfer tax) account for less than one percent of
total tax revenues.3 Observing this shift in the importance of the estate
tax, one might be led to believe that there is a reason for the change.
That is, one might think that the values embodied by the estate tax are
not values that are held by Americans in contemporary society. Perhaps
this change in the role of the wealth transfer taxes reflects a concurrent
change in Americans' beliefs about the importance or impact of
concentrated, inherited wealth in the modem-day United States. I argue
in this Article that this is not, in fact, true. This Article is the second in a
series meant to demonstrate that wealth transfer taxes are, in fact,
consistent with most commonly held philosophical beliefs about social
justice.4 In this Article, I examine the view that a just society is one in
which all citizens are given equal opportunity to achieve success. In
particular, this Article explores the form of equality of opportunity
the EGTRRA estate and gift tax provisions that lowered the transfer tax rate and
increased the lifetime credit amount would have cost approximately $402 billion over the
period of 2010 to 2019 as compared with the revenue that would have been raised if
EGTRRA had been allowed to expire. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OvIONs, VOLUME
2, AT 240 (2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
ftpdocs/102xx/docl0294/08-06-budgetoptions.pdf; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN UPDATE
TO THE BUDGET AND EcONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2012 To 2022, at 64 (2012),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43539-08-22-
2012-Update One-Col.pdf. Leaving the 2009 rates and exemption levels in place would
have raised a total of $420 billion (or 1.2% of total revenues) from 2010 to 2019.
ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF, supra, at 5. Instead of these options, Congress and
the President reached an agreement to avoid going over the so-called "fiscal cliff."
Deborah L. Jacobs, After the Fiscal Cliff Deal: Estate and Gift Tax Explained, FORBES
(Jan. 2, 2013), www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2013/01/02/after-the-fiscal-cliff-
deal-estate-and-gift-tax-explained/. The agreement was reached in the final hours of
2012, and the bill was signed into law on January 2, 2013. Id. The law sets the estate tax
lifetime exemption-equivalent credit at $5 million, adjusted annually for inflation (which
brought it to $5.25 million in 2013 and set the tax rate at a flat 40% for amounts in excess
of that). See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2001, 2010. The new tax law does not have a sunset date and
thus will not have to be extended by another congressional vote.
3. See Jacobson et al., supra note 1, at 125.
4. The first Article in the series addressed libertarianism arguments about taxation
and wealth transfer taxes in particular. See Jennifer E. Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and
Property (Rights): Nozick, Libertarianism, and the Estate Tax, 66 ME. L. REV. 1 (2013).
In that Article, I demonstrated that libertarian arguments about property rights, which
depend upon moral rights stemming from effort exerted on the world, are entirely
consistent with a robust estate tax, even at a rate of 100%, because the death of the
property holder eliminates the property right. See id. The estate tax is then, on libertarian
grounds, one of the few entirely appropriate taxes. See id.
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endorsed by John Rawls. Rawls endorsed the principle of justice as
fairness, primarily based on the concept of luck egalitarianism. 5 For
readers familiar with Rawls' writings, it may not come as a surprise that
Rawls' position is consistent with an estate tax. However, I argue in this
Article that the wealth transfer taxes are, in fact, especially well suited to
achieve equality of opportunity goals. Indeed, without a wealth transfer
tax system in place, even a robust income tax would be unable to address
the fundamental inequality of opportunity present in the contemporary
United States.
Equality of opportunity is at the heart of American political thought.
At least in part, the United States was founded as a rejection of the
European traditions of aristocracy and inherited privilege. 6 However,
contemporary American society is more unequal than ever before.
Equality of opportunity does not necessarily require actual social
economic equality-this is what distinguishes equality of opportunity
from egalitarianism.8 However, when that inequality results in an
inequality in the opportunities being made available to future
generations, then equal opportunity theorists should object. Perhaps even
more noteworthy than the marked differences in wealth between the best
and worst off in contemporary American society is the information we
have about social mobility in the modern United States.9 The presence of
social and economic inequality in the United States does, without
question, result in unequal opportunities being made available to
members of society, and this is a violation of the equality of opportunity
principle. As I will demonstrate in this Article, great social and economic
5. For a detailed exploration of Rawls' theory, see discussion infra Part 11.
6. Much has been written about the fundamental reasons for the American
Declaration of Independence and the American Revolutionary War. For one argument
that the Founding Fathers were motivated by the goal of reducing inequality of
opportunity, see GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1993).
7. A widely seen video has been circulating on the Internet, demonstrating the
growing divide between what Americans think is a fair distribution of wealth, what they
think the current distribution of wealth looks like, and the actual distribution of wealth in
America today. The differences are stark. See Wealth Inequality in America, VISUAL.LY,
http://visual.ly/wealth-inequality-america (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
8. For more on this distinction, see discussion infra Part II.
9. For evidence on social and economic mobility within the United States, see
Daniel Aaronson & Bhashkar Mazumder, Intergenerational Economic Mobility in the
U.S., 1940 to 2000 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2005-12)
(demonstrating that social and economic mobility in the United States has decreased
since 1980 after rising sharply between 1940 and 1980); Sommarat Chantarat &
Christopher B. Barrett, Social Network Capital, Economic Mobility, and Poverty Traps,
10 J. EcON. INEQUALITY 299 (2012) (arguing that social network capital contributes
greatly to the amount of social and economic mobility available to individuals).
716 [Vol. 59:713
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inequality, such as that seen currently in the United States, limits equality
of opportunity, both as a theoretical matter, consistent with Rawls'
arguments, and also as an empirical matter, as can be seen in studies of
social and economic mobility in the United States.' 0
Unlike the income tax," or the less common but occasionally
proposed wealth tax,12 wealth transfer taxes are especially well-suited to
achieve equality of opportunity goals. Because wealth transfers typically
occur between family members, they are at the very heart of the
advantages that stem from being born into a wealthy family. Taxing
these transfers with the goal of reducing the amount transferred and
possibly discouraging such transfers altogether increases the likelihood
that members of modern American society will experience true equality
of opportunity. In addition, if the funds raised through the taxation of
wealth transfers are then used to fund expenditure programs meant to
benefit the least well-off, this system will go even further towards
attaining the equality of opportunity goal."
This Article is not meant to be an endorsement of the equality of
opportunity position, luck egalitarianism, or Rawlsianism itself. Because
of the general consistency of public beliefs with Rawlsian arguments
10. Aaronson & Mazumder, supra note 9; Chantarat & Barrett, supra note 9.
11. The United States personal income tax is imposed by the Code in § I and is
imposed on the basis of marital and household status in graduated rates that increase by
income bracket to a maximum, in 2013, of 39.6%. Tax Imposed, 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2013). In
addition to the personal income tax, § 11 of the Code imposes a tax on corporations, with
a maximum rate in 2013 of 35%. Tax Imposed, 26 U.S.C. § 11 (2013).
12. There is no wealth tax currently imposed by the United States federal
government. Indeed, a wealth tax would be unconstitutional under current U.S. law.
Article I, Section 9 of the United States Constitution requires apportionment of a direct
tax. "No capitation or other direct tax, shall be laid unless in proportion to the census or
enumeration herein before directed to be taken." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. A wealth
tax, as a tax on the holding of property rather than the transfer of property, is a classic
example of a direct tax. For a discussion of the possibility of imposing a wealth tax, see,
for example, David J. Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAx
L. REv. 499 (2000); Beverly Moran, Wealth Redistribution and the Income Tax, 53 How.
L.J. 319 (2010) (discussing the possibility of a wealth tax and specifically exploring the
use of a wealth tax as a means of funding reparations). India currently imposes a wealth
tax on its citizens. See generally Wealth Tax Act, No. 27 of 1957, INDIA CODE (2011),
available at http://law.incometaxindia.gov.in/DIT/other-income-tax-acts.aspx?page=OD
TA&Tabld=tabWTA.
13. In her article, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, Anne Alstott argues
that, in addition to wealth transfer taxation, the federal government should enact a social
inheritance program that would ensure all members of society access to a certain amount
of money, regardless of their socio-economic status. Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity
and Inheritance Taxation, 121 HARv. L. REV. 469 (2007). This is one form of
expenditure program aimed at helping those whose social positions reduce their
opportunities from birth. For more on this proposal, see the discussion infra Part Ill.
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(whether or not most people are aware of this consistency), tax scholars
should take Rawls seriously in contemplating good tax policy. In this
Article, I adopt the Rawlsian position and explore whether and to what
extent wealth transfer taxation can help to achieve the goals of that
theory. I further explore what forms of wealth transfer taxation are best
suited to achieve Rawls' aims. The goal of the Article is both to
demonstrate the way in which some form of wealth transfer tax plays a
critical role in Rawls' overall theory and also to make clear how such a
tax would help to achieve the egalitarian goals of that theory.14 In order
to make these arguments, I first lay out the fundamental principles of
Rawls' philosophy, but this Article is not an evaluation of those
arguments. Rather, it begins by accepting Rawls' argument and moving
on from there. Part I introduces the issues; 5 Part H describes the
Rawlsian theory of equality of opportunity;16 Part III examines wealth
transfer taxes in the context of Rawls' second principle of justice;' 7 Part
IV compares models of wealth transfer taxes from a Rawlsian
perspective;' 8 Part V looks at the question of gifts;'9 and Part VI
concludes.20
A. Wealth Transfer Taxes
The current wealth transfer tax system in the United States is a
combination of three taxes imposed by the Internal Revenue Code (the
Code).2 1 The system includes the estate tax,22 the gift tax,23 and the
14. Note that these two points are not the same. Rawls is not an egalitarian as such,
although he does believe that societies that satisfy his criteria for justice are much more
likely than unjust societies to be egalitarian. For true egalitarian arguments, see G.A.
COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND EQUALITY (1995); G.A. COHEN, IF YOU'RE AN
EGALITARIAN, How COME YOU'RE So RICH? (2000); KARL MARX, CAPITAL (Ben Fowkes
trans., Penguin Books 1976) (1867).
15. See discussion infra Part I.A-B.
16. See discussion infra Part II.
17. See discussion infra Part Ill.
18. See discussion infra Part IV.
19. See discussion infra Part V.
20. See discussion infra Part VI.
21. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended; (Code). All citations to sections are
citations to the Code. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
22. The estate tax is imposed by § 2001. The Code imposes the tax on the gross estate
minus deductions for charitable transfers (§ 2055), liabilities of the decedent (§ 2053),
funeral expenses (§ 2053), and transfers to the surviving spouse (the so-called "marital
deduction," § 2056).
23. The gift tax is imposed by § 2501. The Code imposes the tax on amounts
transferred gratuitously in excess of an annual exemption, provided by § 2503, of
$14,000 in present interests per recipient.
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generation-skipping transfer tax.24 The taxes are imposed upon the
transfer of wealth either during the donor's lifetime (inter vivos gifts are
subject to the gift tax) or upon the transfer of estate assets at the death of
the donor (transfers at death are subject to the estate tax).25 The current
wealth transfer taxes are actually imposed at graduated rates,26 although
the rates are effectively flat, as there is a credit that effectively excludes
all amounts that fall within the graduated rate schedule.27 The lifetime
credit, which is available to shelter up to $5.25 million (adjusted
annually for inflation) of wealth transfer, is also now portable between
spouses, which results in $10.5 million of tax-free wealth transfers that
can now be made per married couple.2 8 Transfers beyond that amount are
subject to tax at the rate of forty percent.29
In addition to the lifetime exemption equivalent credit, donors can
transfer up to $14,000 a year tax-free to any individual they choose and
can make direct payments for educational and medical expenses without
incurring any tax liability. 30 In addition, legally required parental support
24. § 2601. The generation-skipping transfer tax (the "GST tax") is imposed on
transfers that attempt to avoid one generation of the estate or gift tax by passing wealth to
a member of a generation that is one more generation below that of the donor. Alstott,
supra note 13, at 516. For instance, if A leaves an inheritance to her granddaughter C,
even though her daughter B is still alive, that is a generation-skipping transfer. Id. at 517.
Without the GST tax, there would be estate tax imposed on the transfer, but that would be
all. This would be, from a tax perspective, a less expensive transfer than if A left an
inheritance to B, who then passed the wealth on to C. That scenario would incur wealth
transfer taxes twice rather than only once. To ensure that the same amount of tax is
imposed regardless of how many generations are effectively "skipped" in the transfer, the
GST tax is imposed in instances such as this one. While this is clearly an important tax as
a backstop measure, it does not rely on the same philosophical foundation as the estate
and gift taxes. Therefore, I will not examine it closely in this Article. Note, however, that
in her article, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, Anne Alstott points out that if
one is concerned primarily with equality of opportunity, then a generation-skipping
transfer tax is not necessarily an essential part of a wealth transfer tax system. Id. at 516.
Because the goal is ensuring that no one is given an advantage from the outset, it does not
matter from whom the transfer is made. Imposing taxation at each generation is less
important, from this perspective, than equalizing the amount received by any particular
individual. Id.
25. §§ 2001, 2501.
26. § 2010.
27. § 2001.
28. § 2010.
29. § 2001.
30. § 2503. The $14,000 transfer must be a transfer of a present interest. Future
interests (such as interests in a trust) are ineligible for the exemption. For a further
discussion of this issue, see infra note 95 and accompanying text.
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for minor children is not currently taxable, although there is regularly
debate about how liberally "support" should be understood.'
Many commentators note that, although the official estate tax is as
described in this Part, the real concern in contemporary U.S. estate tax
policy is the way in which estate tax attorneys are able to structure their
clients' wealth transfers to either entirely or nearly entirely avoid the
estate tax.3 2 While these concerns about the effectiveness of the wealth
transfer taxes as enacted in the United States are critically important,
they are not the focus of this Article. Once a society agrees on the
necessity of a tax like the U.S. wealth transfer tax system, then all efforts
should be made to enact and enforce it as intended. This Article is
concerned with the more fundamental question of whether and to what
extent a wealth transfer tax is appropriate for achieving the goals
embraced by society. In particular, this Article will show why the wealth
transfer tax, rather than the income tax alone, is uniquely well situated to
achieve equality of opportunity goals. 3 3
Often tax policy analyses focus exclusively or primarily on the
economic consequences of the tax in question. While this approach is
clearly valuable (one would not want to enact a tax that had the actual
effect of working against the goals one had in enacting the tax), this
Article will not be concerned with economics. Before one can determine,
as an economic matter, how best to attain a particular goal, one must
determine just what that goal is. 34 While that depends, at least in part, on
31. "The federal estate tax exempts support if legally required, meaning that parents
or children's legal guardians can spend unlimited amounts on support of minor children
without incurring gift tax liability." Alstott, supra note 13, at 515.
32. Much contemporary writing about the estate tax focuses on the way in which the
tax is entirely avoidable using current planning techniques. For this reason, the estate tax
is sometimes called a voluntary tax. For excellent examples of these arguments, see Paul
L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate Tax to Reduce
Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255 (2013); George Cooper, A
Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 161 (1997); Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, The Estate Tax Non-Gap: Why
Repeal a Voluntary Tax?, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153 (2009); Brant Hellwig, Estate
Tax Exposure of Family Limited Partnerships Under Section 2036, 38 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 169 (2003); Ronald H. Jensen, The Magic of Disappearing Wealth Revisited:
Using Family Limited Partnerships to Reduce Estate and Gift Tax, I Prrr. TAX REV. 155
(2004).
33. Indeed, there is no other tax (e.g., a sales tax, a wealth tax, or an income tax) that
can achieve the same ends as a wealth transfer tax. Because of the special nature of the
wealth transfer tax and its particular aim of combating the transfer of wealth between
generations, this tax is especially well suited to achieving equality of opportunity ends.
34. Rawls emphasizes this point as well, arguing for the priority of liberty over
distributive justice goals. Distributive justice goals are important precisely because of
their importance in preserving liberty within society. This view is not new, although it is
720 [Vol. 59:713
UNSEATING PRIVILEGE
the preferences expressed by society at large, this Article takes the
relatively common Rawlsian position valuing equality of opportunity and
looks at the way the wealth transfer tax system might work towards
attaining that end, without particular concern for the mechanics that
might be needed from an economic perspective. If it turned out, as an
economic matter, that the wealth transfer tax structure that was most
consistent with Rawlsian equality of opportunity had consequences that
reduced the likelihood of the society that adopted it actually achieving
equality of opportunity, then clearly the system would have to be
reevaluated. But starting from the perspective of determining whether
and to what extent a wealth transfer tax is consistent with Rawlsian
equality of opportunity, as well as what form that tax should take, gives
us an important beginning point for this analysis.35
B. Rawls and the Estate Tax
Commentators generally agree that Rawlsian liberalism is
compatible with heavy redistribution. 36 Below I discuss the elements of
Rawls' writings (the original position and the veil of ignorance) that
most clearly contribute to the view that Rawlsian equality of opportunity
requires redistributive tax policy.3 7 However, much of the work using
Rawls to analyze or justify tax policy has focused on the income tax.38
also easily forgotten. Murphy and Nagel advocate the necessity of examining
foundational arguments before applying economic theories to the resulting rules:
Though economic theory provides essential information about the likely effects
of different possible schemes of taxation, it cannot by itself determine a choice
among them. Anyone who advocates the tax policy that is, simply, "best for
economic growth" or "most efficient" must provide not only an explanation of
why the favored policy has those virtues, but also an argument of political
morality that justifies the pursuit of growth or efficiency regardless of other
social values.
LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 12 (2002) (emphasis added).
35. For Rawis, there is no purely economic realm. That is, questions of liberty,
justice, fairness, and opportunity are all already economic issues as well. And,
simultaneously, economic issues cannot be considered independently from issues of
justice and liberty-economics is not a separate question but is tied up with justice. This
makes Rawls especially applicable to, and interesting from, a tax perspective.
36. Most, if not all, tax law articles that make reference to Rawls do so in support of
the proposition that Rawls endorses a redistributive liberal position. See, e.g., Alstott,
supra note 13; Eric Rakowski, Taxing Wealth Liberally, 51 TAX L. REV. 419 (1996);
Charles R. T. O'Kelley, Rawls, Justice, and the Income Tax, 16 GA. L. REv. 1 (1981);
Kerry Ryan, Human Capital and Transfer Taxation, 62 OKLA. L. REv. 223 (2010).
37. See discussion infra Part II.
38. See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2
CHAP. L. REv. 157 (1999); Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations
on Taxation: What Rawls Demands from Tax Systems, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1991 (2004);
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While this work is incredibly useful in making arguments about the
fundamental nature of philosophical arguments in justifying tax policy, I
argue in this Article that the income tax alone is not capable of satisfying
the goals of a Rawlsian equality of opportunity. 39 Because of the
incredible opportunities afforded to recipients of transferred wealth, the
estate tax is the appropriate tool to use in order to achieve true equality of
opportunity.4
II. RAWLSIAN EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
John Rawls' central work of political philosophy, Theory of Justice,
published in 1971, was seen in many ways to change the conversation
that had been happening in that field for thousands of years. 4 1 An
intellectual descendant of Immanuel Kant, among others, one of Rawls'
central arguments was the principle that, in contrast to the arguments of
utilitarianism (one of the dominant political philosophical positions of
the twentieth century), there are central human liberties that cannot be
violated in a just society, regardless of the overall good of society that
might be attained by such a violation.4 2 The extension of Rawls' thought
O'Kelley, supra note 36. Notable exceptions include Alstott, supra note 13, and Ryan,
supra note 36.
39. Sugin argues that "[Rawls'] analysis of philosophical principles does not require
commitment to any particular tax system at all. Numerous tax systems could conceivably
satisfy Rawls's principles of justice." Sugin, supra note 38, at 1998. While this may be
true with regard to the particular mechanics of the tax system imposed, I argue in this
Article that some kind of wealth transfer taxation is, in fact, required by Rawlsian
principles of equality of opportunity.
40. In her article, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, Anne Alstott notes
the way in which wealth transfer taxes are especially well suited to achieve equality of
opportunity goals more broadly. "Equal opportunity ... is widely understood to be the
bedrock principle for wealth transfer taxation . . . ." Alstott, supra note 13, at 542.
41.
In the 1950s and 1960s political philosophy was declared to be dead, or at least
moribund, and it was claimed that creatively constructing a valuational frame
of reference had been abandoned. . . . Political philosophy, which is after all a
field that by definition is concerned with normative questions, came in
academic circles to be considered an "unscientific activity," and it was pushed
more and more into the background.... It is in this context that "at the right
moment" A Theory of Justice was published. While acknowledging that it is
"scientifically" impossible to prove the "correctness" of a normative opinion,
this theory provided the possibility of reasoning on normative issues in an
intersubjective manner.
PERCY B. LEHNING, JOHN RAwLs: AN INTRODUCTION 12-14 (2009).
42.
The basic shortcoming of utilitarianism-in whatever form-is that basic rights
of individuals can be sacrificed for a collective societal goal such as
722 [Vol. 59:713
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in the form of so-called "luck egalitarianism" holds that equality of
opportunity within society must account not only for economic
inequalities but also for the many individual characteristics (beauty,
intelligence, family connections) that make up opportunities in
contemporary society.4 3 Rawls' primary concern was to explain how a
society could be understood to be just and how its citizens could be seen
to be equal." In order to explain the way that the wealth transfer taxes
can contribute to the version of equality that Rawls sees as best, I will
first lay out the fundamentals of Rawls' political philosophy. This Part
will explain the veil of ignorance, the original position, and the two
principles of justice (including the famous difference principle); these are
the three central elements of Rawls' political philosophy and the central
components of the role the wealth transfer taxes can play in ensuring a
just society under Rawls' theory.
maximizing social welfare. It allows an unacceptable trade-off among persons:
utilitarianism formulates a principle which may require lesser life prospects for
some, simply for the sake of a greater sum of advantages enjoyed by others.
Utilitarianism does not recognize that everyone has equal moral worth (which,
as we will see, for Rawls does not entail that distributive shares have to be
equal), and therefore recognizes neither the way persons are equal to each
other, nor the way they differ from each other.
Id. at 17-18.
43.
Freedom of fair choice, fair equality of opportunity, and relative priority for the
position of the least advantaged, are not only core elements of a (political)
conception of justice, they are also characteristics of modem welfare states.
Pointing to the importance of freedom of choice means that, in actual social
economic policies in welfare states, more than has been the case in the past, a
distinction is being made between the positions that people are in, and for
which they themselves bear responsibility, and the positions that they are in for
which they are not to blame, positions that are a consequence of the "Rawlsian"
"contingencies of social life," so to speak. Freedom of choice, in this line of
reasoning, goes together with stressing personal responsibility, provided that
conditions are fulfilled such that people can actually take responsibility for
their choices.
Id. at 220-21.
44.
One can try to deal with this question [of freedom] by viewing political society
in a certain way, namely, as a fair system of cooperation over time from one
generation to the next, where those engaged in cooperation are viewed as free
and equal citizens and normal cooperating members of society over a complete
life. We then try to formulate principles of political justice such that if the basic
structure of society-the main political and social institutions and the way they
fit together as one scheme of cooperation-satisfies those principles, then we
can say without pretense and fakery that citizens are indeed free and equal.
JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 4 (2001) [hereinafter JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS].
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Importantly, Rawls endorses an equality of opportunity position, not
an equality position. That is, Rawls focuses on the equality of members
of society at the outset rather than on whether or not there is an equal
distribution of assets within society at any given moment.4 5 Ultimately, a
lot hangs on this distinction. An egalitarian might require a regular and
ongoing redistribution of wealth to ensure that goods are distributed
equally among all, but such redistribution would not necessarily be
required on an equality of opportunity theory.46 If the distribution of
assets (both economic and non-economic) were sufficiently equal ex ante
to ensure that all members of society were afforded an equal opportunity
to achieve success, then later redistribution would not be required.47 At
that point, any uneven distribution within society would arguably be
attributable to differences in effort.48 That would not, on an equality of
opportunity theory, require alteration, because the individual members of
society all began from the same position. There is much to be said on
what it means for assets to be distributed equally ex ante. In particular,
one central question faced by equal opportunity theorists is whether or
not talents and tastes should be considered assets whose original
distribution must be accounted for.49 One could go even further and
argue that the ability to work hard is itself an arbitrary characteristic,
whose presence should qualify as an asset from the perspective of
equality of opportunity. However, in all of this, the central argument
remains that material distributions must be evaluated in the context of
their ability to serve liberty and justice. That is, the optimal economic
distribution constitutes justice.
The argument for equality of opportunity generally comes from the
principle that all individual members of society are equally valuable. If
one believes that each person has equal worth, then each person's goals
and choices should be valued equally as well. However, the equal
opportunity argument does not claim that throughout an individual's life
her choices should be rewarded equally, regardless of how the market
values that choice. Rather, the equal worth of all individuals is reflected
by the assurance of equal opportunities and the freedom to engage in
those opportunities for all individuals from the beginning. However, this
freedom cannot be merely a formal freedom, meaning that an individual
45. As Linda Sugin writes, "the benefits from individual effort appropriately produce
inequalities in income and wealth, and should not require adjustment under the difference
principle." Sugin, supra note 38, at 2004.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Alstott, supra note 13.
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will not be restrained from acting in accordance with her wishes. That
kind of negative freedom does not ensure any true opportunity if the
individual in question has significantly fewer material goods than other
individuals. Instead, material resources must be made available to all
individuals in approximately equal amounts before it can be said that true
equality of opportunity has been attained.o
A. The Veil of Ignorance and the Original Position
In Theory of Justice, Rawls first articulated his famous theory of the
original position and the veil of ignorance.5' He then clarified and
extended his view in Justice as Fairness.5 2 A central concern with any
work in political philosophy, Rawls contends, is that one's views of
justice will necessarily be influenced by one's own actual place in the
world. In response to this, Rawls proposes that political philosophy and
evaluations of justice should be done from behind a veil of ignorance.54
That is, the justice of any particular distribution of wealth and other
beneficial qualities should be evaluated before one knows where one will
fall within that society. In this way, even the worst off member of society
will have a position that will have been endorsed as acceptable by all.55
50. See PHILLIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL: WHAT (IF ANYTHING) CAN
JUSTIFY CAPITALISM? (1995); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL
STATE (2008); BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOn', THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999).
51. Rawls describes the original position as follows:
First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status;
nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities,
his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his
conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the
special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to
optimism or pessimism. More than this, I assume that the parties do not know
the particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know its
economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has
been able to achieve. The persons in the original position have no information
as to which generation they belong.
JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE: REVISED EDITION 118 (1999) [hereinafter THEORY OF
JUSTICE].
52. JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 44, at 15.
53. "The difficulty is this: we must specify a point of view from which a fair
agreement between free and equal persons can be reached; but this point of view must be
removed from and not distorted by the particular features and circumstances of the
existing basic structure." Id.
54. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
55. One might argue that it is impossible to fully engage in this thought experiment
because one cannot truly shed one's own identity in evaluating the justice of particular
distributions. Rawls himself acknowledges the difficulty of appropriately applying the
original position when he writes "Some may object that the exclusion of nearly all
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Rawls views this hypothetical ignorance as critically important in
attaining a truly just society, as various inequalities that result from
historical accidents should not be allowed to influence the definition of
justice.56 This is central to Rawls' particular view of equality of
opportunity because it is not only economic particularities that are hidden
behind the veil of ignorance but also, among other things, the particulars
of an individual's race, sex, geographical location, and level of
education. As a result, insights about justice can be made from the point
of view of a truly blank slate, free from the prejudices of any specific
individual situation.
The point of view of the individual who is hidden behind the veil of
ignorance is what Rawls calls the original position.57 It is from this
position that we are best poised to determine what true justice looks like.
Rawls argues that without the prejudicial influences of particular
situations, reasoned argument can be used to arrive at the social structure
that most closely satisfies the requirements of justice.ss Rawls moves
from the original position to establish what he views as the social
structure that satisfies the requirements of justice. It is from this
argument that the title of his last work, Justice as Fairness, comes.5 9 In
the original position, all individuals are equal, and they develop fair rules
regardless of their particular subjectivity. 60 That is to say, the rules
developed from the original position are those one would choose,
regardless of whatever else it is that one would want in the world.
particular information makes it difficult to grasp what is meant by the original position."
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 119. However, Rawls' response to this concern is
that the goal of the original position is limited to determining what principles should
apply universally. "[S]ince the differences among the parties are unknown to them, and
everyone is equally rational and similarly situated, each is convinced by the same
arguments. Therefore, we can view the [choice] in the original position from the
standpoint of one person selected at random." Id. at 120.
56. "Contingent historical advantages and accidental influences from the past should
not affect an agreement on principles that are to regulate the basic structure from the
present into the future." JUSTICE As FAIRNESS, supra note 44, at 16.
57. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 118.
58. Id. at 121.
59. "[The] position is set up as a situation that is fair to the parties as free and equal,
and as properly informed and rational. Thus any agreement made by the parties as
citizens' representatives is fair. . . . Hence the name: justice as fairness." JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS, supra note 44, at 16.
60. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 51.
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B. The Two Principles of Justice
The rationale Rawls uses for applying the veil of ignorance to
deliberations about the just distribution of goods in society is that
individuals in the original position (that is, the position of individuals
behind the veil of ignorance) are uniquely qualified to evaluate fairness
within society.6 ' As a result, the position of justice that deliberation
behind the veil of ignorance arrives at is necessarily a fair position.
Rawls argues that deliberation regarding fairness in society that occurs
behind the veil of ignorance results in the adoption of two principles of
justice, which are the articulation of freedom.6 2 Rawls articulates the two
principles as follows:
(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is
compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; 6 3 and
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two
conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and
second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-
advantaged members of society (the difference principle). 4
These two principles are at the core of Rawls' theory of what social
structure constitutes a just system. The first of these two principles (point
(a) above, the "first principle of justice"), deals with the required liberties
an individual must have in society in order for that society to be properly
considered just.6 5 Rawls endorses a Kantian view of liberty.66  At the
61. For more on this point, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
62. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 51.
63. The basic liberties that Rawls endorses are
freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; political liberties (for example,
the right to vote and to participate in politics) and freedom of association, as
well as the rights and liberties specified by the liberty and integrity (physical
and psychological) of the person; and finally, the rights and liberties covered
by the rule of law.
JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 44, at 44.
64. Id. at 42-43.
65. Sugin argues that this first principle of justice has significant negative
implications for the design of any tax structure held to be just on Rawlsian grounds.
The first principle may impose significant limitations on systems of taxation
because it demands that every individual have equal basic liberties. Based on
this limitation, justice as fairness would preclude an endowment tax, which
taxes people according to their abilities to earn, regardless of the actual
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core of his first principle is a notion of equal liberty, in which there are
no special liberties available to people on the basis of race, gender,
economic or social status, or any other arbitrary criteria.67 Instead, under
Rawls' theory, essential liberties must be available to all members of
society equally, regardless of their specific situations. 6 8 While this is a
critically important issue, and much has been written about it,6 9 the first
principle of justice is not as essential to an analysis of the tax system as
the second principle of justice (point (b) in the excerpt above).70
choices they make to earn. Protection of individual autonomy, not economic
justice, drives the limitation. In addition, the first principle precludes any tax
system that allows economic inequalities to interfere with the integrity of the
political system. Thus, where concentrations of wealth produce
concentrations of political power, the first principle would require the tax
system to break up politically threatening concentrations of wealth so that
equal liberties of citizenship are possible.
Sugin, supra note 38, at 2005 (emphasis added).
66. His Kantian view differs from other views like those of Locke and Mill in that it
is ultimately a view of positive liberty, much closer to Hegel's view of Ethical Life than
to Mill's harm principle. See, e.g., GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (1821); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Longman, Roberts &
Green 1859). Rawls elaborates his positive view of liberty in the third part of Theory of
Justice. THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 51. For Rawls' Kantian heritage, see id. at § 40
and JOHN RAWLS, Themes from Kant's Moral Philosophy, in KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL
DEDUCTIONS: THE THREE CRITIQUES AND THE OPus POSTUMUM 81 (Eckart Forster ed.,
1989).
67. "It is assumed, then, that the parties do not know certain kinds of particular facts.
First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does
he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and
strength, and the like." THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 118.
68. From the original position behind the veil of ignorance, priority is given to basic
liberty. This priority is independent of any particular characteristics because, again,
behind the veil of ignorance no individual knows her particular characteristics. As Rawls
writes,
The persons in the original position are moved by a certain hierarchy
of interests. They must first secure their highest-order interest and
fundamental aims (only the general form of which is known to them),
and this fact is reflected in the precedence they give to liberty; the
acquisition of means that enable them to advance their other desires
and ends has a subordinate place.
Id. at 476.
69. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (2d ed.
1998); AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (2009); RONALD DWORKIN, THE ORIGINAL
PosITIoN, in READING RAWLS 16 (Norman Daniels ed., 1989).
70. Importantly, Rawls sees the first principle of justice as prohibiting an endowment
tax, which could easily take the form of a wealth tax (although not all wealth taxes would
necessarily be endowment taxes). In Justice as Fairness, Rawls writes,
[An endowment tax] would violate the priority of liberty. It would force the
more able into those occupations in which earnings were high enough for them
to pay off the tax in the required period of time.
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Therefore, I will focus the rest of this Part on the second principle of
justice, also known as the difference principle.
C. The Difference Principle
At the core of Rawls' equal opportunity theory of justice is the
second principle of justice, known as the difference principle.
Importantly, this principle does not forbid social and economic
inequalities in a just society.7 1 Rather, such inequalities are permitted, but
only to the extent that the positions with which the inequalities are
associated are open to all and the inequalities are such that they improve
the position of the least well-off.7 2 This requirement is at the center of the
distinction between an egalitarian philosophy (such as that endorsed by
Karl Marx and G.A. Cohen, among others) 73 and a philosophy requiring
equality of opportunity. Egalitarian theories generally would not view as
... [O]our native endowments are ours and not society's: ... we cannot be
subject to [an endowment tax] to equalize the advantages our endowments
might confer. That would violate our basic liberties.
JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 44, at 158.
71. While it is true that Rawls' position tolerates inequalities, it does not tolerate
massive inequalities, as he explicitly explains:
The objection is that since we are to maximize (subject to the usual constraints)
the prospects of the least advantaged, it seems that the justice of large increases
or decreases in the expectations of the more advantaged may depend upon
small changes in the prospects of those worst off. To illustrate: the most
extreme disparities in wealth and income are allowed provided that they are
necessary to raise the expectations of the least fortunate in the slightest degree.
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 136. Rawls' response to this objection is to refer
back to the way in which the two principles of justice reinforce one another, which means
that in a truly just society, massive disparities of wealth will not occur.
The possibilities which the objection envisages cannot arise in real cases; the
feasible set is so restricted that they are excluded. The reason for this is that the
two principles are tied together as one conception of justice which applies to
the basic structure of society as a whole. The operation of the principles of
equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity prevents these contingencies from
occurring.
Id.
72. Rawls illustrates the so-called maximin rule nicely when he writes,
[T]he two principles are those a person would choose for the design of a society
in which his enemy is to assign him his place. The maximin rule tells us to rank
alternatives by their worst possible outcomes: we are to adopt the alternative
the worst outcome of which is superior to the worst outcomes of the others.
Id. at 133.
73. See KARL MARX, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (Penguin Classics 1985); COHEN,
supra note 14.
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just a system that permitted any social or economic inequalities.74 By
contrast, Rawls' theory understands that such inequalities may be present
in a just society. However, if the inequalities are such that the positions
that bring higher incomes and better rewards are only available to those
who are born into certain families, or who look a certain way, or who
live in certain places, then those inequalities would violate the first
requirement of the difference principle (namely, the requirement that
positions associated with inequalities be open to all).
The second requirement of the difference principle, the requirement
that inequalities be to the benefit of the least well-off, is the element that
is often appealed to in order to justify progressive taxation and general
theories of taxation that impose heavier taxation on economically better-
off members of society.7 6 Under this theory, the current levels of
inequality in contemporary American society might be permissible under
the theory that large concentrations of wealth allow for high levels of tax,
which create government revenues that can, in turn, be used for the
benefit of the lowest-income members of society. However, the second
requirement of this principle of justice is clearly not met in contemporary
American society. Much contemporary wealth is passed down from
generation to generation. Social mobility in the United States is
surprisingly low, and individuals generally grow up to enter the same
social and economic class in which their parents lived. This fact about
contemporary American society flies in the face of the second Rawlsian
principle of justice.
The first part of the second principle of justice requires that the
positions associated with social and economic inequalities be open to all
74. MARX, supra note 73; COHEN, supra note 14. Marx and Cohen, as well as other
egalitarians, are primarily concerned about equality of outcome more than merely
equality of opportunity. As a result, these theories tolerate heavy redistributive taxation
throughout an individual's lifetime.
75.
[P]ositions are to be not only open in a formal sense, but all should have a fair
chance to attain them.. . . [T]hose with similar abilities and skills should have
similar life chances. More specifically, assuming that there is a distribution of
natural assets, those who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the
same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success
regardless of their initial place in the social system ....
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 63.
76. See, e.g., MARX, supra note 73; COHEN, supra note 14.
77. Note that I am not making the argument here that this is in fact the case in
contemporary American society. Much empirical work would be needed to determine
whether the least well-off are or are not better off under the system of inequality in place
today. That is not the work of this Article.
78. See, e.g., Aaronson & Mazumder, supra note 9.
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members of society. This requirement of equal opportunity means that
inherited wealth, which provides economic advantages to the children of
wealthy parents, must be limited in a just society. Importantly, though, it
is not only the inheritance of wealth that offers social and economic
advantages to the children of wealthy parents. Even if a government
imposed a confiscatory wealth transfer tax so that no wealth could be
passed down to future generations, parents would still have numerous
ways to improve the lives of their children. Education, health care,
clothing, vacations, and even introductions to the right social circles are
all benefits given to children by their parents, none of which would be
affected by a confiscatory wealth transfer tax. Indeed, our current wealth
transfer tax system exempts from transfer taxation amounts that are paid
for the education or health care of another.79 Properly following the
second principle of justice, all of these benefits made available by
parents to their children violate a just society.
III. WEALTH TRANSFER TAXES AND RAWLS' SECOND PRINCIPLE OF
JUSTICE
Wealth transfer taxes are not the only tool a government can use to
try to ensure equality of opportunity. Indeed, in most societies, wealth
transfer taxes have been a relatively small part of the tax system.
Further, many argue that one cannot determine the justice of any
particular governmental system without examining both the tax and
transfer regimes of that government.80 Government revenues are
primarily generated through taxation.81 This means that an analysis of the
justice of any particular society must involve a consideration of both the
tax system and the transfer systems or expenditure programs that are
funded by the revenues raised through that tax system. A society that
demonstrates the equality of opportunity required by Rawls must have
79. § 2503 of the Code exempts transfers made directly to the provider of health care
or education services from the gift tax. § 2503. As a result, large amounts of wealth can
be transferred for the benefit of another without the imposition of any tax. This
exemption can apply to the payment of insurance premiums, tuition for university, high
school, primary school, and even preschool. Courts have ruled that even the prepayment
of tuition, as long as it is non-refundable, can be excluded under § 2503. See, e.g., I.R.S.,
Tech. Adv. Memo. 99-41-013 (Oct. 15, 1999); I.R.S., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 06-02-002 (Jan. 13,
2006). For more on this issue, see Kerry A. Ryan, Human Capital and Transfer Taxation,
62 OKLA. L. REV. 223 (2010).
80. Louis KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC EcoNoMics (2008).
81. For example, in 2012, the revenue collected by the United States federal
government was $2,450,164,000,000. See Historical Tables, OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historicals (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). The tax
system was responsible for collecting over 95% of that amount. Id.
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robust expenditure programs in place in order to ensure that education,
health care, housing, and more are made available to all members of that
society. The revenues needed to provide these programs must be raised
by taxation, and it has generally been accepted that wealth transfer
taxation alone would be insufficient to generate that kind of revenue.82 If
that is true, then Rawlsian equality of opportunity will require not only a
wealth transfer tax but also an income tax.83 However, an income tax
alone, even one with high rates, would be insufficient to achieve
Rawlsian equality of opportunity.8 Income taxes do not address the
privileged position of heirs, which is why wealth transfer taxes are
especially well suited for attaining equality of opportunity.
82. This has primarily been true because the base of the wealth transfer tax has
always been small (and has been shrinking dramatically in recent years). If the base was
increased by reducing the amount of the exemption equivalent credit, and if the rate was
increased beyond the current 40% level, then the wealth transfer tax system would
generate significantly more revenue.
83. Anne Alstott explains the concerns associated with using an income tax to fund
the expenditure programs necessary to achieve equality of opportunity. Because an
income tax can violate the principles of equality of opportunity, tending instead towards
egalitarianism, Alstott sees risks in funding her proposed public inheritance (one form of
an expenditure program meant to equalize opportunity) with income tax revenues. She
writes,
Whether this solution [a 100% inheritance tax] is the right one depends on the
justice and injustice of the alternative revenue sources. Lowering inheritance
tax rates below 100% means tolerating private inheritance, which is unjust. But
raising other taxes - say, income taxes-may also work an injustice. For
example, the income tax tends to penalize market work relative to leisure and
nonmarket work (as does a consumption tax). An income tax also penalizes
savers relative to spenders (which a consumption tax arguably does not). Thus,
raising income taxes may require weighing an affront to equal opportunity
(unequal inheritance) against an affront to neutrality (penalizing certain ways of
life).
Alstott, supra note 13, at 495.
84. The current U.S. federal income tax does not include gifts and inheritances in
income. § 102. Because of that, even a robust income tax would not tax amounts received
in gratuitous transfers. One possible solution to this part of the problem would be to
include gratuitously transferred amounts in income. Indeed, several commentators have
proposed this. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Comparing a Reformed Estate Tax with an
Accessions Tax and an Income-Inclusion System, and Abandoning the Generation-
Skipping Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 551 (2003). However, even including these amounts in
income would be insufficient to achieve equality of opportunity because those who are
born into positions of privilege would receive wealth merely as a result of their position,
even if the amount of that transfer is reduced via the income tax. Treating earned and
inherited amounts in the same way (rather than preferencing inherited amounts, as our
current tax system does) will not resolve the problem Rawls sees.
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A. Inequality of Position
Contemporary American society has significant economic
inequality. This in itself is not a violation of Rawls' theory of equal
opportunity because, again, Rawls endorses equality of opportunity
rather than equality of position or egalitarianism. 8 6 If the inequalities
present in society had been arrived at only through differences in effort,
then it is entirely possible that Rawls would accept the current
distribution of wealth as just.87 Because equality of opportunity theorists
accept that even with true equality of opportunity present, equality of
condition does not necessarily result, Rawls need not critique current
society as necessarily unjust. It is possible that with the same original
opportunities, different members of society end up in different positions
with regard to social and economic status. Equality of opportunity does
not necessarily view as unjust the uneven distribution of talents or ability
to exert effort.88 If that uneven distribution of talents and effort results in
additional opportunities being made available to the children of the
talented, then that would violate the principles of Rawlsian equality of
opportunity. It is not difficult to see that if wealth is allowed to pass
unchecked down to future generations, the inequality present in the
original, equal opportunity state could grow exponentially.
B. Inequality of Position: An Example
Consider the following example: Assume a society with true equality
of opportunity where no child is given any financial or social advantages
at birth.89 Michael and Nicholas are born into this society in the same
year and have exactly the same economic situation at birth. Through a
series of events, because he works harder, is more intelligent, and is
more cutthroat than Nicholas, Michael becomes significantly wealthier
than Nicholas. By the time they are thirty, Michael has $500,000 in
85. See, e.g., Aaronson & Mazumder, supra note 9.
86. For a discussion of equality of opportunity versus equality of outcome, see
discussion supra Part II.
87. As discussed earlier, Rawls did not actually believe that a society following his
two principles of justice would have great social and economic inequality. See supra note
71 and accompanying text.
88. However, proponents of equality of opportunity might actually view the uneven
distribution of talents as unfair. See discussion supra Part II.
89. Clearly such a state seems at least unlikely, if not impossible. However, a small
commune with these characteristics might not be as impossible. History provides
examples of many such communes, none of which has continued successfully. For further
discussions of this issue, see Clifford F. Thies, The Success of American Communes, 67
S. EcON. J. 186 (2000).
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assets, and Nicholas has only $50,000 in assets. Michael has a son named
Oliver and Nicholas has a son named Paul. Both Michael and Nicholas
die in a car accident as soon as their sons are born. Assuming no
prohibitions on inheritance, no wealth transfer tax, and no other heirs,
Oliver inherits $500,000, while Paul inherits only $50,000. Even if
everything else is equal in this society and even if nothing has changed
since Michael and Nicholas were children, I submit that Oliver and Paul
will likely end up in very different places by the time they are adults.
Whereas the difference between the positions of Michael and Nicholas
was a result of the differences in their personal qualities (intelligence,
effort, etc.), differences between Oliver and Paul will come, at least in
part, from the very different economic situations from which they begin.
Not only that, but it is very likely that the gap between Oliver and Paul
will continue to grow. Oliver's large amount of wealth will permit him to
engage in opportunities that just will not be available to Paul. Oliver will
be able to afford an expensive education, better health care, memberships
in influential clubs, and nicer housing. Further, Oliver can invest his
wealth to increase his income even further. In this way, the mere
presence of additional wealth at birth results in significant differences
(and, at least potentially, exponentially growing differences) between
these two members of what was, just one generation ago, a society with
equality of opportunity for all of its members.
This is to say, it is not the mere existence of social or economic
inequality that violates the Rawlsian requirements of justice. Even a
society rife with inequality, like the contemporary United States, could
satisfy Rawls' requirements if inheritance is prohibited. But allowing
wealthy individuals to transfer their wealth to the objects of their
affection ensures that the wealth gap will continue to grow. In this way,
significant wealth inequality in society makes it more likely that equal
opportunity will not be available within that society. Additionally, the
accumulation of large amounts of wealth in the hands of a small number
of people also makes it significantly less likely that such a society is an
equal opportunity society. If an individual accumulates more wealth than
she is able to spend in her lifetime, then that wealth will pass to her heirs
upon her death. As wealth in the United States becomes more
concentrated in the hands of fewer people, it becomes more likely that
those people will transfer some of their wealth to others rather than
consuming all of their wealth during their lifetimes.9 0
90. The concentration of wealth in the United States has, in turn, led to further
concentrations of wealth, thereby limiting social and economic mobility. For a further
discussion of this issue, see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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IV. A RAWLSIAN WEALTH TRANSFER TAX
So far this Article has focused on the role that a wealth transfer tax
can play in achieving the equality of opportunity goals endorsed by
Rawls and others.9' I will now turn to an exploration of what form of
wealth transfer tax best suits those goals. Currently, the United States
imposes an estate and gift tax on wealth transfers.92 These taxes are, as a
matter of mechanics, imposed on the transferor.93 The tax is imposed in
the same way and at the same rate regardless of the recipient.9 4 As a
result, a donor can transfer large sums of money, indeed, the entirety of
her wealth, to a single donee with the same tax consequence as if she had
distributed it to several donees.95 There is, of course, great debate about
where to set the transfer tax rate, but unless the rate is set at 100%, the
wealthiest members of society will still be able to transfer all of their
wealth (minus the transfer tax that they owe) to one donee.96 As a result,
concentrated wealth will remain in the hands of heirs. 97 The tax system,
as it stands now, creates no incentive for wealthy donors to diversify
their gifts because the amount of tax owed is the same whether the donor
91. See discussion supra Part II.
92. §§ 2001, 2501.
93. §§ 2002, 2502. The estate and gift taxes are excise taxes imposed on the transfer
of wealth, but the tax itself is levied on the transferor-the estate in the cases of an
inheritance, the donor in the case of a gift.
94. The only exception to this is transfers made to the spouse of the transferor. There
is an unlimited marital deduction in both the gift and estate taxes. §§ 2056, 2523. As a
result, a donor (or decedent) can give (or bequeath) unlimited wealth to her spouse
without having any tax imposed. This marital transfer, combined with the newly
implemented portability of the lifetime credit, is at the heart of much estate planning.
Any credit that goes unused in the hands of one spouse can now be used by the surviving
spouse. § 2010. As a result, for many couples, the best strategy now is to leave all wealth
at death to the surviving spouse and also leave the entirety of the $5.25 million exemption
equivalent credit to that spouse. That way the surviving spouse can both use what he
needs during his lifetime and still get the benefit of both spouses' credits when he dies.
95. There is one way that transfers to several recipients can reduce the amount of
transfer tax owed by a donor. § 2503 of the Code permits an annual transfer of $14,000
per individual to occur tax-free. § 2503. In fact, this Code section defines this first
$14,000 present-interest transfer as not a gift at all. Id. There are limits, primarily the
limit that the transfer must be of a present interest and not a future interest. Id. However,
a donor could conceivably transfer all of her wealth tax-free if she finds a sufficient
number of donees to receive the $14,000 per year. While this is an important exception, I
do not consider this a real impact on the equality of opportunity provided by our current
system, because most donors do not, in fact, transfer all of their wealth in increments of
$14,000 to millions of people.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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gives to several recipients or only one.98 Another transfer tax structure
could do more to encourage the breaking up of large concentrations of
wealth.
Rawls himself, in Justice as Fairness, endorsed an accessions tax. 99
An accessions tax, a version of an inheritance tax, imposes a tax on the
recipient of the transfer.' An accessions tax incorporates a lifetime
perspective, meaning that in most accessions tax structures, an individual
will have one lifetime exemption above which all inheritances received
will be taxed either at graduated or flat rates.' 0 While the federal
government does not have an inheritance tax in place, several states in
the United States do have such a system.'0 2 In addition to the imposition
of the tax on the recipient of the transfer, inheritance taxes typically have
a per donee exemption.10 3 Because of this per donee exemption, an
98. Id.
99. JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 4. As Alstott notes, "The familiar-and
correct-point is that equality of opportunity tends to support a lifetime tax on
inheritance, that is, an accessions tax." Alstott, supra note 13, at 502-03 (citing David G.
Duff, Taxing Inherited Wealth: A Philosophical Argument, 6 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 3, 45-62
(1993); Eric Rakowski, Transferring Wealth Liberally, 51 TAX L. REV. 419, 431 (1996)).
See also Sugin, supra note 38, at 2009.
Because equal opportunity must be renewed at every generation, an accessions
tax may be preferable to an estate tax because it is sensitive to the
concentrations of individual wealth going forward. If the allocations of
resources that develop over time produce concentrations of wealth that prevent
equal opportunities across generations, then taxation would be necessary to
readjust those opportunities at every generation.
Id.
100. Id.
101. "An estate tax collects tax at graduated rates based on lifetime bequests by
individuals, while an inheritance tax collects tax at graduated rates based on inheritance
by individuals. When an inheritance tax incorporates a lifetime perspective, it is termed
an 'accessions tax."' Alstott, supra note 13, at 502.
102. Indiana (1.C. 6-4.1), Iowa (Iowa Code Ch. 450), Kentucky (KRS 140.010),
Maryland (Maryland Code 7-202), Nebraska (Nebraska Statute 77-2018.04), New Jersey
(N.J.S.A. 54:33-1 et seq.), and Pennsylvania (Pa. Code section 2106) each have a
different set of criteria, rates, and exemption classes and amounts. However, in general,
transfers to surviving spouses or children are either exempted from the tax or are subject
to tax only after a large exemption amount, or at lower rates, or both.
103. In the version that is currently in place in most of the states in the United States,
in addition to a per donee exemption, there is a larger exemption for those who are more
closely related to the decedent. For instance, in Kentucky, Class A beneficiaries,
including spouses and children, are not taxed at all on their inheritances; while Class B
beneficiaries, including nieces and nephews, receive a $1,000 exemption, are taxed at 4%
on inheritances between $1,000 and $10,000, and are taxed at rates that graduate to 16%
on amounts over $200,000; and Class C beneficiaries, including those with no blood or
legal relation to the decedent, receive a $500 exemption from the inheritance tax, are
taxed at 6% on inheritances between $500 and $10,000, and are taxed at rates that
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accessions tax encourages the diffusion of wealth by reducing the tax
owed when wealth is distributed more widely, rather than being
transferred all to one or two donees.10" In this way, the tax system itself
can be set up to encourage the dilution of concentrated wealth.o0
However, merely imposing tax at a higher rate, or offering additional
tax exemptions if the wealth is transferred to several recipients, cannot,
on its own, ensure that concentrated wealth is dispersed or that the
children of wealthy parents will not receive additional opportunities as a
result of their position. It is entirely conceivable that a wealthy decedent
would decide to leave all of her wealth to her daughter despite the fact
that such a decision would increase the total amount of tax that would be
paid on that wealth.
Consider the following example: Assume an inheritance tax is in
place that has a $1 million per heir exemption, regardless of the
relationship between the heir and the donor. Assume further that, after
amounts excluded by the exemption, an inheritance tax is assessed on the
donee at the rate of 75%. Abigail has a $101 million estate. She has
many friends and relatives, all of whom would be thrilled to receive $1
million transfer tax-free upon Abigail's death. However, Abigail has
only one child, a daughter, Beatrice. Abigail is not especially opposed to
taxation, and she would prefer to transfer all of the assets in her estate to
her daughter rather than distributing the assets in $1 million pieces to 101
various friends and relatives, thereby avoiding taxation entirely. If
Abigail leaves everything to Beatrice, $1 million of the inheritance will
be exempt from tax, and Beatrice will owe $75 million in tax on the
remainder of the transfer. This leaves $26 million to Beatrice (the $1
million exempted amount and the $25 million left over after the tax is
imposed). In this instance, the inheritance tax, meant to encourage the
breaking up of Abigail's $101 million of concentrated wealth, did not
truly attain that end. Despite the fact that more taxes were imposed on
her wealth, Abigail's desire to transfer her wealth in as concentrated a
form as possible to her daughter trumped her desire to pay less tax. If
graduate to 16% on amounts over $60,000. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 140.060, .070,
.080 (West 2013). This system actually flies in the face of equality of opportunity goals.
Because additional exemptions and lower tax rates are given for transfers to those closest
to the decedent, this system works to ensure that the wealth remains concentrated in the
hands of that wealthy family. In this way, not all inheritance or accessions tax systems
are necessarily best for the goal of equality of opportunity. For a further discussion of this
issue, see Bird-Pollan, supra note 4.
104. "From an equal opportunity point of view, an estate of $500,000 divided among
ten heirs is less objectionable than the same estate left to one heir, but an estate tax treats
the two scenarios the same." Alstott, supra note 13, at 503.
105. Id.
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donors remain more motivated to keep their wealth within their family
than they are motivated to pay less tax, then it will not matter what form
the tax takes. Perhaps Abigail would leave a few million dollars tax free
to some of her nieces or nephews-this may break up a bit of her wealth.
However, because every additional dollar that Abigail gives to someone
other than Beatrice reduces by twenty-five cents the amount that her
daughter receives, if Abigail's primary concern is to provide for her
daughter, she is likely to limit the amount she gives to other people even
though this approach will increase the total amount of tax incurred by the
transfer. 0 For many donors, this seems likely to be true.
Despite the fact that the inheritance tax system described above does
not prevent the continued concentration of wealth in the example I give,
there is a clear benefit to the transfer described. Because of the heavy tax
rate, the government collects $75 million in taxes on that transfer. With
that new revenue, the government could create significant programs
aimed at improving the situations of the least well-off members of
society, thus increasing overall equality of opportunity in that society.
Because this is the goal of this transfer tax system, at least for the
purposes of this Article, one might still call this overall result a success.
Of course, the imposition of an estate tax at 75% would also raise
significant amounts of revenue. However, a 75% inheritance tax seems
more politically feasible than a 75% estate tax. Because the inheritance
tax is, at least arguably, avoidable if the decedent distributes her wealth
more widely, it seems possible that a heavy tax on amounts transferred
above the exemption amount would be seen as more reasonable than a
heavy tax on all amounts transferred above one total exemption amount,
as in the current estate tax model.
Given that it is unlikely that the form of transfer tax imposed on
wealth transfers will have a significant impact on the concentration or
dilution of that wealth, it seems at least possible that the only truly
effective strategy to prevent the continued transfer of concentrated
wealth is the prevention of transferring wealth altogether. However,
given the political unpopularity of all wealth transfer taxes in the
contemporary United States, it seems incredibly unlikely that a 100%
confiscatory tax would garner any political support.
106. In the proposed model, every dollar over $1 million that Abigail transfers to
Beatrice incurs a tax of 75 cents, leaving Beatrice with 25 cents of inherited wealth.
Abigail could choose to transfer that entire dollar to a niece, which would be a tax-free
transfer, assuming that person has not yet used up her $1 million exemption. As a result,
leaving an addition dollar to another heir would reduce Abigail's transfer to Beatrice by
25 cents.
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V. WHAT ABOUT GIFTs?
Imposing an estate tax at a rate of 100% with no exemption would
effectively prevent transfers of wealth at death. This prevention of
inherited wealth would reduce the additional opportunities afforded to
the children of wealthy parents, at least to some degree.10 7 However,
even a rate of 100% could not prevent transfers of wealth by gift, as
demonstrated in the following example: Suppose Charlotte has $100
million in assets and wants to transfer the assets to her daughter Diana.
Suppose further that there is no wealth transfer tax exemption, and the
federal tax rate on all wealth transfers is 100%. Assuming that Charlotte
holds on to the assets until she dies, the tax will be assessed at a rate of
100% with no exemption, and the federal government will collect $100
million from Charlotte's estate in the form of an estate tax. By contrast,
if the transfer happens while Charlotte is still alive, then she can transfer
$50 million to Diana, and the assessed transfer tax at a rate of 100% will
result in a gift tax of $50 million paid to the federal government. In other
words, a 100% estate tax is essentially a prohibition on transfers at death,
but there is no way to prohibit inter vivos transfers through the use of a
tax. Even if the gift tax is at 200%, Charlotte can make a transfer of $33
million to Diana, which would incur a tax of $66 million, which she
could pay out of her existing assets. If Charlotte is willing to pay the tax,
then a wealth transfer tax on a transfer she makes by gift cannot prohibit
that transfer; it can only reduce the amount available to be transferred.
While this reduction is clearly desirable from an equality of opportunity
perspective, large amounts of wealth could still be transferred by gift.
There are U.S. citizens with tens of billions of dollars of wealth. Even a
200% or 300% gift tax would still allow these donors to transfer vast
amounts to their loved ones. Of course, those transfers would generate a
lot of tax revenue, and that revenue could be used to fund programs
aimed at increasing the opportunities available to the least well-off
members of society. But despite the additional opportunities made
available by this revenue, a gap in opportunity will remain if inter vivos
wealth transfers occur.'0 8
107. Even without the possibility of leaving wealth to children, wealthy parents could
still provide significant advantages to their children in the form of education, good health
care, and a powerful last name, among other things. For more discussion of this point, see
supra note 79 and accompanying text.
108. In her article, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, Anne Alstott does not
distinguish between inter vivos transfers and post-death transfers. She does not argue for
a distinction between the two, claiming "unless otherwise specified, the tax treatment of
gratuitous transfers should be the same whether the transfer is inter vivos or at death."
Alstott, supra note 13, at 501. In this respect, I disagree with Alstott because the effect of
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If the government permits the transfer of wealth by gift, then some of
those transfers will, in fact, occur. No amount of taxation can prevent
those transfers; the tax system can only make inter vivos transfers more
expensive. It might be, then, that in order to achieve true equality of
opportunity in the United States, the government must impose a
prohibition on these transfers rather than merely attempting to tax them.
As a matter of political viability, however, it seems extremely unlikely
that the government would enact a prohibition on transfers by gift. If an
outright prohibition on transfers is impossible, the next best option, from
the perspective of equality of opportunity, is likely a high tax rate on
those transfers. At a minimum, that high rate would reduce the amount of
wealth available to be transferred. In addition, the tax could raise
significant amounts of revenue for the government, which could then be
used to fund programs aimed at improving opportunities for the least
well-off members of society. While this would not ensure complete
equality of opportunity (because the wealthy would still be able to
transfer wealth to their children), it would generally improve the
situation by reducing inequalities of opportunity, at least to some degree.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have demonstrated that Rawlsian equality of
opportunity is consistent with and, indeed, demands a heavy wealth
transfer tax in order to ensure justice within a society. Further, I have
demonstrated that the form of transfer tax that is most consistent with
Rawls' goals is an accessions tax with one lifetime exemption, above
which the tax should be imposed at a rate of 100%. In order to ensure
that this tax is not avoided through the transfer of wealth by gift during
the donor's lifetime, gifts above the lifetime exemption rate should be
prohibited by law.
Without this system in place, equality of opportunity would be
impossible because individuals who accumulate more than they can
spend in their lifetime would pass that accumulated wealth on to their
children, who would, as a result, have a significant advantage over other,
less well-off members of society from the beginning. The income tax
would go some way towards combatting this inequality by raising
revenue that could be used to provide opportunities to low-income
members of society, but that alone would not ensure equality of
opportunity within society. Rawlsian liberty requires that no special
advantages be made available on the basis of any arbitrary criteria.
an estate tax at 100% is radically different from the effect of a gift tax at 100%. That is
the argument of this Part.
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Whether or not one is related to a wealthy person who then decides to
bestow her wealth in one's direction is the epitome of arbitrariness. A
wealth transfer tax, in particular one designed as an accession tax, is at
the core of ensuring that such arbitrariness does not result in an unjust
society.
